India-Pakistan relations have mostly been under strain for the past seven decades. For several years now there has been no engagement between the two sides at the highest political level.
But despite the fraught relationship, the Indus Water Treaty signed by the two sides in 1960 has remained in force all these years. However, questions have begun to be raised in both countries about whether the treaty has outlived its purpose and whether the time has come to review it and factor in the changed reality. Sharat Sabharwal, India’s former High Commissioner to Pakistan is regarded as one of the leading experts on Pakistan and the bilateral relations between the two countries. Recently he wrote a highly acclaimed book, ‘India’s Pakistan Conundrum’ on the complex relationship.
He spoke to Pranay Sharma to explain why the Indus Water Treaty has come under strain and the implications if it was to be scrapped. Excerpts of the interview: Why has the Indus Water Treaty become so contentious? Sharing of waters of the Indus basin between India and Pakistan, both water-stressed countries, has been contentious since 1947. There is a strong belief in India that too much water of the basin (80 percent) was given to Pakistan under the Indus Waters Treaty (Treaty) concluded in 1960 and an equally strong view in Pakistan that it did not get its due. Nonetheless, the Treaty worked well for the first fifty years or so.
Problems have, however, grown with India stepping up construction of run-of-the-river hydroelectric projects, permitted under the Treaty, on Indus, Jhelum and Chenab – rivers allotted to Pakistan. Pakistan has sought to use the Treaty provisions to hinder this activity. It has also been blaming India for its water woes, resulting from its growing population, water mismanagement and climatic factors. On January 25 India sent Pakistan a “Notice for modification” of the treaty.
Is it political rhetoric or a serious attempt to amend an agreement to reflect the current reality? No, it is not political rhetoric. The Treaty can be amended through mutual consent. Media reports, quoting official sources, allude to at least three Indian concerns. First, disagreements on the implementation of the Treaty need to be referred either to a neutral expert or a Court of Arbitration (COA) depending upon their nature.
Pakistan has of late shown the tendency to take all issues to a COA. Second, the Treaty requires India to provide technical parameters of every project to Pakistan at least six months before the commencement of river works to give it some time to seek any clarifications. In practice, Pakistan has sought to use this provision as a veto by continuing to raise objections well beyond the period of six months. India would like to see greater clarity in the Treaty on the above aspects.
Third, India would like to incorporate lessons of the last 62 years, as well as water management techniques that have been developed after 1960. Can India force Pakistan to change its behaviour by using water as a lever? The use of water as an instrument of coercion by India is an overblown option. The Treaty can be rescinded only through mutual consent. A unilateral withdrawal by India would provoke an international campaign by Pakistan, which is likely to evoke sympathy among influential countries because of the precious resource involved.
But what happens if India decides to go ahead ignoring the reaction of others? Even if we decide to brazen out such a fallout, there would be practical problems. India has not fully utilised even its own share of water under the Treaty, much less build the time-consuming and costly infrastructure in challenging mountainous terrain to divert Pakistan’s share from Indus, Jhelum and Chenab to its water-starved plains. Till this is done, gravity will continue to take water to Pakistan. At the same time, Pakistan ought to realise that in seeking to use the word of the Treaty to block Indian projects, it may be eroding India’s cooperation, which is so essential to preserving its spirit.
Signalling this may also have been one of India’s motives in proposing the Treaty modification. Since neither India nor Pakistan is satisfied with the Treaty shouldn’t it be reworked or scrapped altogether? Scrapping the Treaty will bring no immediate significant gains for India. In spite of its constant complaints, Pakistan as the lower riparian will continue to cling to it for dear life. Under the circumstances, updating it and bringing clarity in contentious areas is the best option.
Carried out maturely, this exercise could add considerable value to the Treaty. Otherwise, as is more likely in view of the current state of the relationship, it may end up in acrimony. Has the World Bank been fair in ensuring the interests of both countries are met in the Treaty? The Treaty was concluded with the good offices of the World Bank and it has a role in appointing neutral experts and members of COAs. There was nothing to complain about its conduct till recently.
However, because of differences between India and Pakistan on the resolution of some issues concerning India’s Kishanganga and Ratle projects, with India wanting a neutral expert and Pakistan, a COA, the World Bank took the unprecedented step last year of appointing both the mechanisms simultaneously. There is a risk of getting contrasting verdicts on the same issue and can be seen as the immediate trigger for the Indian demarche. Is this the worst phase in India-Pakistan relations in a non-war situation? The India-Pakistan relationship has been problematic at the best of times but went into a freefall post the Uri terror attack in 2016, till the restoration of the LoC ceasefire in February 2021. Building upon the ceasefire has not been possible because of Pakistan’s demand to reverse India’s move to withdraw the special status of J&K. This is an impossible condition but because of the current sharp political polarisation in Pakistan, a climbdown is not possible.
What is basically missing in the relationship? Bereft of a positive identity at its inception, Pakistan came to define itself as the antithesis of India and adopted an adversarial posture. Its army-led establishment perpetuated it because of its institutional interest in sustaining the India bogey to underpin its prime position in the polity. Pakistan also remains a highly dysfunctional state primarily due to the civil-military imbalance. This makes consensus-building on peace with India impossible.
Can the relationship improve? I believe it is not possible to normalise our relationship with Pakistan till it resolves its dysfunction. The best we can do in the meanwhile is to manage it to reduce its volatility and violence by combining deterrence with a calibrated punitive approach but also dialogue and diplomacy, which should not be ruled out simply because it is a difficult relationship. In the next two years, parliamentary elections are due in Pakistan and India. Do you see any significant improvement in relations before that? The electoral cycle in the two countries will naturally constrain their ability to make peace moves; therefore, any significant improvement in the relationship should be ruled out till then.
A best news channel which publishes latest videos from Jammu and Kashmir which includes Politics, Public Grievances, Current affairs, Off-beat stories, Religion, etc. and We want to combine literature and journalism on one platform.
